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IN RE MARRIAGE OF MULLONKAL

A medical student and a mechanical engineer walked down the aisle.1 They lived
happily ever after. Until they didn’t.2 It is the common tale of modern-day unions.3
Young adults vow to start a life together with dreams of having it all—each a
fulfilling career and together a lasting love—only to learn (or finally admit) a few
years later that they are not meant to be.4 Worse than splitting up, they now must
split their assets.5 For newlyweds in California, that includes reinstating a spouse’s
school loans even though the debt was satisfied during the marriage.6 This was a
sound principle at the time of California Family Code section 2641’s enactment,7
when the “put hubby through” practice8 was prevalent in America.9 Contemporary
findings of such circumstances confirm that the principle is sound.10 But in the 2020
case of In re Marriage of Mullonkal, the California Court of Appeal permitted abuse
1.

In re Marriage of Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 288, 292 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).

2.

Id. at 288.

3.

See 48 Divorce Statistics Including Divorce Rate, Race, & Marriage Length, It’s Over Easy (Apr. 19,
2021), https://www.itsovereasy.com/insights/divorce-statistics (“[T]he younger one is when they get
married, the more likely they are to ultimately get divorced.”); Alison Bowen, The Ups and Downs of
Getting Divorced in Your 20s, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/
sc-fam-divorce-in-20s-0213-story.html (reporting that young marriages typically end between the
second and fifth anniversaries).

4.

See Roni Caryn Rabin, Millennials in No Rush to the Altar, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2018, D4 (reporting
that millennials want “more to marriage than just love”).

5.

California is a community property state; all real or personal property acquired during marriage belongs
equally to each spouse. Cal. Fam. Code § 760 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of 2022 Reg. Sess.). Upon
divorce, courts divide community property “equally.” Fam. § 2550. But see James R. Ratner, Distribution of
Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: Equitable Doesn’t Equal Equal, 72 La. L. Rev. 21, 23
(2011) (describing judges as “reluctant to assign” a fifty-fifty meaning to community property).

6.

See Fam. § 2641 (providing for reimbursement to one spouse for the other’s educational expenditures
unless doing so would be unjust).

7.

The substance of section 2641 was first codified in Civil Code section 4800.3 in 1985. Cal. Civ. Code
§ 4800.3 (repealed 1994). Section 2641 took effect in 1994 and replaced section 4800.3 “without
substantive change.” Fam. § 2641; 23 Cal. L. Revision Comm’n, 1994 Family Code 9 (1993)
[hereinafter 1994 Family Code].

8.

The “put hubby through” practice garnered national attention prior to and throughout the 1980s. See,
e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 535 & n.5 (N.J. 1982) (finding it common for a wife to be left
shortly after funding her husband’s higher education); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 714 (N.Y.
1985) (describing a wife left two months after her husband graduated from the medical school program
that she financed).
A spouse who was “putting hubby through” school was said to be “getting a Ph.T.” Marvin M.
Moore, Should a Professional Degree Be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Divorce?, 15 Akron L. Rev. 543,
543 (1982).

9.

See 17 Cal. L. Revision Comm’n, Recommendation Relating to Reimbursement of Educational Expenses,
in Recommendations Relating to Family Law 229, 233 (1983) [hereinafter CLRC, Recommendation]
(responding to the “put hubby through” predicament).

10.

Cf. In re Marriage of Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (permitting
reimbursement in an amount proportional to wife’s contributions to husband’s medical degree, less any
benefits to her from its acquisition); Roosevelt v. Ray, 220 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the
notion that any funds put toward a spouse’s education are “community funds” meriting reimbursement).
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of that well-intentioned principle.11 The result in effect forced a medical school
graduate to repay her student loans not once, but twice.12
When Carolyn Mullonkal (“Carolyn”) filed for divorce, the California Court of
Appeal was asked to decide a matter of first impression: Does a trial court have
discretion to deny reimbursement to the community for one spouse’s educational
expenses13 if acquisition of that education was not the fruit of community efforts? In
other words, if Carolyn worked to put herself through school and to support the
community during her marriage to Sithaj Kodiyamplakkil (“Sithaj”), may the trial
court deny Sithaj reimbursement for payments Carolyn made on her student loans
while married?14
This Case Comment contends that the Mullonkal court erred when it held that
Carolyn must reimburse Sithaj.15 First, the court discounted section 2641’s legislative
history and applicable California precedent,16 both of which demonstrate that the
trial court considered proper criteria when it exercised its discretion to deny
reimbursement.17 Second, the court erred when it made a categorical rule out of the
rebuttable presumption that a marriage does not “substantially benefit[]” from a
spouse’s education if it ends within ten years of its acquisition.18 The court therefore
failed to give due consideration to several benefits that Sithaj enjoyed during his
nearly four-year marriage.19
Carolyn began repaying her student loans at the start of her medical residency in
2009, having borrowed roughly $120,000 to put herself through medical school.20
She earned about $45,000 in salary at the time and moved home to live with her
parents in Michigan while completing the program.21 On August 27, 2011, Carolyn
married Sithaj, whom she met in India.22 For the next two or so years, everything
about the pair remained separate: Sithaj lived in India, Carolyn lived in Michigan;
11.

See 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).

12.

Id. at 297.

13.

California’s “reimbursement right” permits one spouse to recover money and other resources expended
on the other’s education if that education “substantially enhanced” the earning capacity of that other
spouse. 1994 Family Code, supra note 7, at 292–93.

14.

See Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288–89, 291–92.

15.

Id. at 297.

16.

See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9 (recommending reimbursement for spouses who put the other
through school); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1022–23 (Cal. 1984) (considering whether
wife’s “economic sacrifices” merited reimbursement); In re Marriage of Slivka, 228 Cal. Rptr. 76, 77
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (considering whether wife’s payment of husband’s medical school expenses merited
reimbursement).

17.

Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.

18.

See id. at 296 (citing Fam. § 2641(c)(1)).

19.

Id.; see discussion infra pp. 100–01, 113–15.

20. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 289.
21.

Id. at 288–89. Carolyn’s parents also paid for her first year of medical school. Id. at 289.

22.

Id. at 288.
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Sithaj worked in mechanical engineering, Carolyn worked in medicine; Sithaj kept
his own bank accounts and paid his own bills, Carolyn kept and paid hers.23 Carolyn
completed her residency in June 2012 and immediately went to work at a Michigan
hospital.24 She earned $225,000 annually but continued to live with her parents to
save money and paid them for expenses as her budget permitted.25
In May 2013, Carolyn leased a two-bed, two-bath apartment in California for
herself and Sithaj.26 He joined her that July after she paid the legal and filing fees
necessary for him to obtain a green card. 27 Sithaj was a business analyst with a
mechanical engineering degree and thirteen years of work experience between India
and the United States.28 Yet Sithaj did not—and made no meaningful attempt to—
work after the move, and his job-hunting façade came to a screeching halt when he
let his green card, which gave him legal work status, “inexplicably” expire in 2015.29
He lived off of Carolyn, who took a pay cut to work as an emergency room physician
at a local hospital and paid all of the couple’s expenses, including rent, utilities, auto,
and food.30 Sithaj “did not financially support [Carolyn] in any way,”31 even though
he held securities in excess of $100,000 and “stashed” money in bank accounts across
India.32 And when he received stock dividends, he deposited them into his personal
bank account, to which Carolyn had no access.33 Sithaj also took out loans totaling
more than $150,000 prior to, during, and after his marriage, some of which he

23.

Id. at 288, 292 n.5. The couple maintained separate bank accounts throughout their marriage.
Respondent’s Brief at 6, Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (No. C085825).

24.

265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288.

25.

Id. Carolyn paid a total of $75,000 to her parents and brother between September 2011 and July 2013.
Id. at 289. Of that, $9,500 was to her brother: $9,000 to repay a loan and a $500 gift. Id. The remainder
was to her parents for living expenses throughout her medical residency and for repair of their roof. Id.
At times, she paid certain travel expenses for her parents, brother, and other family. Id.

26. Id. at 288; see also Respondent’s Brief at 16, supra note 23 (“[T]he lease was in Carolyn’s name alone.”).
27.

265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288. A green card permits non-U.S. citizens to permanently work in the United
States. Green Card, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card (last visited
Apr. 21, 2022). “Carolyn had to fill out forms stating he was her husband to allow him to come to the
United States.” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (No. C085825).

28. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 6–7; 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 292 n.5.
29. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 15 (“[Sithaj] made no effort to restore his legal work status.”).
30. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288–89; Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 6. Carolyn paid $1,200 a month in

rent and leased a car for the couple for $350–$400 a month. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288.

31.

265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 292 n.5; see Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 6, 8 (establishing Sithaj’s intent to
live off Carolyn).

32.

Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 4–6 (adding that Sithaj held joint bank accounts with his father).

33.

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 27, at 21.
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managed to repay while married but from what source he was “unsure.”34 He never
told Carolyn about any of his loans.35
The couple also took several vacations at Carolyn’s expense.36 In 2014, they went
on a cruise, 37 took two trips to Hawaii, 38 and Sithaj made a three-month return to
India. 39 That same year, Carolyn satisfied her institutional debt, began digging
herself out of the debt owed to her parents,40 and gave birth to the couple’s first child
for whom she was the sole provider.41 In January 2015, she filed for divorce.42 The
trial court relied on the foregoing to deny Sithaj’s request43 for reimbursement of
money Carolyn paid on her student loans,44 holding that the remedy would be
contrary to legislative intent45 and unjust under subsection 2641(c).46
34. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 27, at 20, 22–23. Sithaj testified as follows: Prior to his marriage,

he borrowed $100,000; during his marriage, in 2014, he borrowed $30,000 from his father and repaid
that in full in May 2015, after separating from Carolyn; and between August 2014 and August 2015, he
borrowed $24,000, also from his father. Id. at 22–23.

35.

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 27, at 19.

36. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 289.
37.

Carolyn also paid for her parents to join her and Sithaj on the cruise. Id.

38. They went to Hawaii in 2013 as well for Carolyn’s work; she paid all costs not covered by her employer.

Id.

39.

Id. at 288 n.2, 289 (specifying that Carolyn paid for Sithaj to visit India for two-to-three months).

40. Carolyn owed more than $100,000 to her parents for her college education. Id. at 289. Beginning in

2014, she paid $2,000 a month until satisfying the debt with two installments, first in December 2014
for $48,080.37 and then in January 2015 for $60,000. Id. Not only did she tell Sithaj about all except
the final installment, but she also “gave Sithaj access to all of her financial information whenever he
requested it.” Id.; Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 3, 6.

41.

Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 21.

42.

Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288. Carolyn paid for Sithaj to stay at their home while he looked for
new living arrangements; ten months later, she voluntarily gave him $15,000 to help that effort but
ultimately had to obtain a court order for him to reside elsewhere. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23.

43.

For Sithaj’s additional claims, see Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 3–5.

44. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 289–90. Sithaj was awarded $10,000 in attorneys’ fees. Id. at 289.
45.

The trial court reasoned that the legislature intended to reimburse a working spouse who “devotes
substantially all their time and work . . . to support the . . . community and . . . education of the student
spouse.” Id. at 294.

46. Id. at 290–91. Section 2641 provides, in part:

(b) [U]pon dissolution of marriage . . . (1) The community shall be reimbursed for
community contributions to education . . . of a party that substantially enhances the
earning capacity of the party. . . . (c) The reimbursement . . . required by this section shall
be reduced or modified to the extent circumstances render such a disposition unjust,
including, but not limited to, any of the following: (1) The community has substantially
benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for the education or training of the
party. There is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that the community
has not substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training
made less than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding, and that the
community has substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or
training made more than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding. . . .
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Long before California became the first U.S. state to enact no-fault divorce as the
exclusive means to “the end,”47 its family courts exercised broad discretion over marital
disputes to produce equitable results consistent with social change.48 California courts
gave expansive readings to statutory rigors that otherwise forbade divorce absent a
showing of criteria49 reminiscent of that which stalled Henry VIII’s annulment during
the pre-Reformation era.50 In old England, canon law invalidated a union only if there
were impediments attendant to its formation, such as a criminal act or incestual ties;
this decree would strip from the female spouse her title as “lawful wife.”51 Likewise, in
1872, California passed fault divorce legislation limiting marital dissolution to
situations in which one spouse charged that the other was a felon or guilty of, for
example, “adultery”52 or “extreme cruelty.”53 In response, the courts broadened the

Cal. Fam. Code § 2641 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
47.

See Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce Laws in the 50
States, 51 Fam. Rels. 317, 322 tbl.2 (2002). The term “no-fault divorce” is defined as “[a] divorce in which
the parties are not required to prove fault or grounds beyond a showing of the irretrievable breakdown of
the marriage or irreconcilable differences.” Divorce, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

48. See Herma Hill Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 937, 938

(1977) (pointing to California courts as leaders in recognizing that various family relationships exist);
Howard A. Krom, California’s Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 Pac. L.J. 156, 156 (1970)
(opining that California ended fault divorce because it was “outmoded and irrelevant”).

49. See Meredith A. Nelson, California Family Law Act, 3 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 425, 427 (1970) (listing

crime, “adultery,” and “extreme cruelty” as bases for fault divorce prior to the 1970s).

50. See Paul J. Goda, The Historical Evolution of the Concepts of Void and Voidable Marriages, 7 J. Fam. L. 297,

297–98 (1967). Simply put, the mid-sixteenth century Reformation era symbolizes Europe’s break from
the Roman Catholic Church, led primarily by German Augustinian monk Martin Luther in defense of
Protestantism. Jacob Wisse, The Reformation, Essays, Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, Learn with Us,
Met (Oct. 2002), https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/refo/hd_refo.htm. King Henry VIII headed
the Church of England after his break with the Roman Catholic Church for the pope’s refusal to annul
his first marriage. Id. (chronicling King Henry VIII’s ascent).

51.

Goda, supra note 50, at 298. Canon law was established by and evolved with the Church of Christianity
in the early sixteenth century. Vivan A. Peterson, The Development of the Canon Law Since 1500 A. D., 9
Church Hist. 235, 242–51 (1940). Rooted in tradition, discipline, and salvation, canon law governed
nearly all legal disputes during pre-Reformation Europe. Id.; Wisse, supra note 50. At that time, Roman
clergy courts (ecclesiastical courts) had exclusive jurisdiction over canonical, or relational, dissolutions,
whereas the King’s Court (temporal courts) typically had jurisdiction over disputes related to marital
property rights. See Goda, supra note 50, at 298, 302, 304. Through a series of retreats from and returns
to this dual system, English law, for which canon law was the framework when England broke from
Rome, finally merged in the mid-sixteenth century to preside over both property and canonical disputes.
Id. at 301.

52.

Prior to California’s enactment of Civil Code section 43.5 in 1939, acts of adultery also enabled the
“alienated” spouse to state a claim for damages against “the other woman.” Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5
(Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.); see Shaddock v. Medoff, 53 P.2d 385, 386 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1936) (seeking damages from husband’s mistress for “alienating [her] husband’s affections”). For
a history of these so-called “heartbalm” laws, see Comment, California Reopens the ‘Heartbalm’ Action:
Marriage. Breach of Promise. Fraudulent Promise. ‘Anti-Heartbalm’ Statute, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 406 (1957).

53.

Civ. § 92 (repealed 1970).

102

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

conditions for fault divorce, particularly the “extreme cruelty” condition,54 into
ordinary grounds for divorce as a matter of law.55 The courts also developed a public
policy rationale to circumvent the statutory rigors altogether through application of
the “marital breakdown test.”56 This judicially activistic approach calmed an aspiring
divorcée’s motivation to falsely claim that the other cheated on the marriage or had
been gratuitously cruel—a perjurious offense—in a bid to satisfy the statute.57 It also
triggered California’s divorce reform efforts in the 1960s.
With a focus on equitable division of property,58 California passed the Family
Law Act of 1969 (FLA) after finding that fault divorce no longer served the public
interest.59 The act confronted increasing divorce rates, collusive efforts to prevail on
fault grounds, and inequitable division of marital property.60 In sum, the act got rid
of the punitive aspect of fault divorce in favor of a neutral claim: irreconcilable
differences.61
The “put hubby through” practice62 rose to prevalence in the 1980s, when wives
worked to put their husbands through school with the expectation that they would
enjoy a better life in return but instead received divorce papers shortly after their
husbands received diplomas.63 A breach of this kind left wives at a loss for which
54. “Extreme cruelty” is defined as “the wrongful infliction of grievous bodily injury, or grievous mental

suffering, upon the other by one party to the marriage.” Civ. § 94 (West 1872) (repealed 1970); Nelson,
supra note 49, at 428 (adding that California courts broadened the “extreme cruelty” condition “beyond
recognition”).

55.

See Nelson, supra note 49, at 428–29, 428 n.15 (reporting that 96 percent of California divorce filings
claimed “extreme cruelty”).

56. Id. at 429. The marital breakdown test provided for divorce as a matter of public policy “where the

relations between husband and wife [we]re such that the legitimate objects of matrimony ha[d] been
utterly destroyed.” Id. (quoting De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952)).

57.

See id. at 428–29 (illustrating staged hotel scenes proffered by spouses to satisfy statutory divorce
standards).

58. See Krom, supra note 48, at 161–62 (detailing legislative concerns related to the division of marital

property).

59.

Cal. Fam. Code §§ 2000–2452 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.); see Richard G.
Osborn, Dissolution and Voidable Marriage Under the California Family Law Act, 4 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
331, 331 (1971) (FLA revolutionized divorce).

60. Ruth B. Dixon & Lenore J. Weitzman, Evaluating the Impact of No-Fault Divorce in California, 29 Fam.

Rels. 297, 297–98 (1980) (FLA objectives).

61.

Id. The “irreconcilable differences” concept was inspired by the 1952 landmark case De Burgh v. De
Burgh, in which the California Supreme Court held that it would make “a mockery of marriage” to
adhere to the literal mandate of fault divorce because doing so would bar divorce despite the “irremediable
breakdown of the marriage.” 250 P.2d at 603, 606; see Krom, supra note 48, at 167, 174–75.

62. The highly publicized 1985 case of O’Brien v. O’Brien illustrates the “put hubby through” practice nicely:

Loretta contributed most of the support during the marriage. 489 N.E.2d 712, 713–14 (N.Y. 1985).
Michael received his license to practice medicine in 1980 and filed for divorce two months later. Id.

63. See In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (finding a pattern

of cases in which a wife funded her husband’s education but received divorce papers instead of a brighter
future).
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there was no clear legal recourse.64 The issue reached the California Supreme Court
in the 1984 case of In re Marriage of Sullivan.65 Sullivan crystalized the challenges
that encumbered the judiciary’s efforts to construct an equitable remedy for suits of
this nature without having to broaden the definition of “community property” to
include a professional degree.66 The California Law Revision Commission (the
“Commission”) proposed a solution in 1983,67 while Sullivan was pending.68 The
Commission advised the legislature to enact a remedy whereby the “working spouse”
who supported the “student spouse” would be reimbursed for that support if the
latter filed for divorce shortly after graduating.69 Civil Code section 4800.3 was
passed in 1984 to provide for this reimbursement.70
Section 4800.3’s legislative history repeatedly distinguished spouses by referring to
them as the “working spouse” and the “student spouse.”71 Not once did the legislature
or the Commission refer to spouses as the “non-student spouse” and the “student
spouse.”72 Both legislative arms, then, envisioned a spouse who worked to support the
couple and the student spouse’s educational endeavors.73 This is made clear by the

64. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9.
65.

691 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Cal. 1984).

66. See id. at 1022 (questioning whether the trial court was correct to follow an intermediate court’s decision

that “professional education does not constitute community property” (citing In re Marriage of Aufmuth,
152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979))); Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969) (declining to accord monetary value to a spouse’s legal education for purposes of dividing marital
assets upon divorce).

67.

CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9. The Commission is an independent California state agency
established to “assist[] the Legislature and Governor by examining California law and recommending
needed reforms.” General Information, Cal. L. Revision Comm’n, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ (last visited
Apr. 21, 2022).

68. Sullivan granted a hearing in 1982 “primarily to determine whether a spouse who has made economic

sacrifices to support the other spouse’s education is entitled to compensation upon dissolution of the
marriage.” 691 P.2d at 1022. The California legislature enacted Civil Code former section 4800.3 in
1984, which generally applied to all related decisions pending at the time, including Sullivan. See id.

69. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9.
70. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.3 (repealed 1994). In 1994, Family Code section 2641 replaced Civil Code

section 4800.3 “without substantive change.” Cal. Fam. Code § 2641 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14
of 2022 Reg. Sess.); 1994 Family Code, supra note 7, at 292.

71.

See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9.

72. Civ. § 4800.3; CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9; Memorandum from Nathaniel Sterling, Assistant

Exec. Sec’y, Cal. L. Rev. Comm’n, Reimbursement of Educational Expenses (Aug. 8, 1983) [hereinafter
Sterling Memorandum], http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1983/M83-072.pdf (recommending statutory
solutions to the “put hubby through” problem).

73. Cf. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 599 (2004) (interpreting a statute in light of

its “tide of context and history”); see also In re Marriage of Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 290–91
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
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Commission’s express intention for the working spouse to recover only monies
expended, and for the student spouse to return only monies gained.74
The legislature also adopted the Commission’s recommendation that “the amount
to be reimbursed should be reduced to the extent circumstances (rather than
‘extraordinary’ circumstances) render the reimbursement unjust.”75 Specifically, the
legislature authorized trial courts to deny reimbursement whenever “circumstances
render the disposition unjust.”76 Subsection 4800.3(c) listed non-exclusive examples
of these circumstances. Subsection 4800.3(c)(1), for example, noted that it would be
unjust to burden the student spouse with reimbursement for their education if the
marriage had “substantially benefitted” from that education.77 For “simplicity,” this
exception was guided by a rebuttable presumption that the marriage had not
benefitted if it ended within ten years of that education.78 However, the Commission
admitted that this presumption was “arbitrary” and advised courts to avoid
reimbursement as needed.79
Sullivan was first to construe section 4800.3 and held that trial courts must
assess the “economic sacrifices” made by the working spouse in support of the student
spouse’s education to determine whether the working spouse is entitled to
reimbursement.80 It defined “economic sacrifices” as including the work of one spouse
74.

See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 235 (“[Reimbursement] takes from the student spouse only
what was actually given and restores to the working spouse only what he or she actually lost.”); see also
id. at 236 (“[T]he student spouse is educated at the working spouse’s expense.”).

75. Meeting Minutes, Cal. L. Revision Comm’n, (Sept. 19, 1983) (on file with New York Law School Law

Review). Compare Sterling Memorandum, supra note 72, at 3 (proposing that the Commission
recommend to the state legislature an “extraordinary circumstances” standard for purposes of reducing
reimbursement, consistent with the standard then existing “in the statute requiring educational loans to
be assigned for payment to the spouse receiving the education”), with Civ. § 4800.3(c) (“The
reimbursement . . . required by this section shall be reduced or modified to the extent circumstances
render such a disposition unjust . . . .”) (emphasis added).
The California legislature’s omission of the “extraordinary circumstances” language from the
reimbursement statute despite its use in neighboring provisions of the Civil Code, for example in subsection
4800(b)(4) regarding the assignment of student loans, indicates the legislature’s intent to accord trial
courts broad discretion in the reimbursement context. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 148, 159–60 (2000) (holding that Congress’s omission of “tobacco” from a food and drug
law, in contrast to its inclusion in related laws, demonstrated congressional intent to exclude tobacco
matters from the law’s ambit).

76. Cal. Fam. Code § 2641(c) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
77.

Civ. § 4800.3(c)(1). Subsections 4800.3(c)(2) and (3) gave additional examples of situations in which
reimbursement would be unjust, such as the community funding the education of both spouses.
§§ 4800.3(c)(2)–(3).

78. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 237 (pointing out that the ten-year timeline guiding the

no-substantial-benefit presumption is to “achieve simplicity” and mitigate the potential for “unreliable
evidence of expenditures”).

79. Id. (“The [ten]-year limitation is admittedly arbitrary . . . .”).
80. 691 P.2d 1020, 1021–23, 1025 (Cal. 1984) (“[C]ompensable community contributions are defined as

‘payments made with community property for education or training or for the repayment of a loan
incurred for education or training.’” (quoting Civ. § 4800.3)); see also In re Marriage of Slivka, 228
Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing for reimbursement where community property funded
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to support the other’s education without the opportunity to benefit from its
acquisition.81 Thus, if the Sullivan wife did not have the opportunity to benefit from
her husband’s medical school education after having worked to support him, the trial
court was to award reimbursement proportionally.82 The 1986 case of In re Marriage
of Slivka further defined the spouse eligible for reimbursement as the “working
spouse [who] supported the community and the student spouse during the acquisition
of the professional education.”83 It also contemplated the measure of reimbursement
as an amount proportional to the value of any support provided.84 Sullivan and Slivka
created the legal framework to ascertain whether a spouse can recover under
California’s reimbursement provisions, jointly holding that reimbursement may be
appropriate where a “working spouse” made “economic sacrifices” to support the
other’s education but had no opportunity to benefit therefrom.85
In 1994, section 4800.3 was replaced by section 2641 “without substantive
change.”86 Nine years later, the 2003 case of In re Marriage of Weiner applied the
Sullivan and Slivka framework.87 There, the California Court of Appeal held that
reimbursement may be appropriate under section 2641 when one spouse worked and
contributed to the repayment of the other’s student loans.88 Weiner emphasized that
the couple made a joint effort to repay the debt during their roughly five-year
marriage.89 But Weiner also found that the wife—the working spouse in this case—
may have already benefitted from her husband’s education and therefore held that
any reimbursement may be reduced proportionally.90 Weiner credited the husband’s
evidence demonstrating that the couple shared in his annual bonuses, which he
would not have earned had he not been a doctor.91 Thus, the husband was entitled to
a determination as to whether that evidence sufficed to rebut the no-substantial-

one spouse’s education); In re Marriage of Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding reimbursement appropriate even if the loans repaid with community property stemmed from
an education obtained prior to the marriage); In re Marriage of Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. 783, 789 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (factoring living expenses into the totality analysis employed by courts to assess the
contributions made by the non-student spouse the student spouse’s education).
81.

691 P.2d at 1021, 1025.

82. Id. at 1022–23.
83. 228 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
84. Id. (“[R]eimbursement [goes] to the community for expenditures made in acquisition of the student

spouse’s education . . . .”).

85. Sullivan, 691 P.2d at 1021–23; Slivka, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
86. 1994 Family Code, supra note 7, at 292.
87.

129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

88. Id.
89. Id. (finding that the acquired degree was “the fruit of community effort”).
90. Id. at 291–92.
91.

Id. at 292.
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benefit presumption set forth in subsection 2641(c)(1).92 It was irrelevant that the
couple had only been married for five or so years in contrast to the ten-year time
frame guiding that presumption.93 If the couple was found to have already benefitted
from the husband’s education, then the trial court had to find whether it would be
unjust to award reimbursement in full or in part.94
Weiner is consistent with the expectations of the 1989 California Court of Appeal
in In re Marriage of Watt.95 Although the wife worked while her husband studied
medicine and made economic sacrifices for the couple to the satisfaction of the
Sullivan and Slivka standard, the Watt court denied reimbursement because there was
insufficient evidence96 to show that those sacrifices were necessitated by her husband’s
tuition payments, which he instead satisfied with student loans.97 The wife, therefore,
suffered no loss.98 Watt held that the no-substantial-benefit presumption only treats
the working spouse favorably when the marriage “reaps no advantage” from the
student spouse’s education.99 The fact that the husband’s education came at no cost to
the wife (her funds remained free for her savings or some other use), operated as a
benefit sufficiently substantial to render reimbursement unjust.100
Weiner and Watt supplement the Sullivan and Slivka framework when a student
spouse submits evidence of the benefits that the couple derived from his or her
education and requests for reimbursement to be reduced proportionally. Sullivan and
Slivka establish that section 2641 applies when a working spouse supported the
other’s education but had no opportunity to benefit from its acquisition.101 Weiner
and Watt establish the two-part evidentiary inquiry to be applied under subsection
2641(c)(1) when the working spouse is alleged to have directly or indirectly benefitted
from that education. First, the student spouse is entitled to a determination as to
whether the no-substantial-benefit presumption has been rebutted when evidence
suggests either that the couple would not have derived some benefit but for that
spouse’s education (a direct benefit)102 or that economic sacrifices made by the
working spouse were not necessitated by the student spouse’s education (an indirect
92.

Id.

93.

See id. at 289, 292; Cal. Fam. Code § 2641(c)(1) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).

94. See Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292.
95. 262 Cal. Rptr. 783, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
96. The Watt court reviewed evidence concerning the wife’s contributions to her husband’s career and the

couple’s lifestyle. Id. at 787–90.

97.

Id. at 785.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 792.
100. Id.
101. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1021–23 (Cal. 1984); In re Marriage of Slivka, 228 Cal.

Rptr. 76, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

102. Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292.
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benefit).103 Second, if the presumption is rebutted, then the trial court must determine
the extent to which reimbursement should be reduced or denied.104
Sullivan and Slivka did not preclude the possibility that reimbursement may be
denied when a spouse made no economic sacrifice to support the other’s education.105
Likewise, Weiner and Watt did not give dispositive weight to the ten-year time frame
that guides the no-substantial-benefit presumption.106
Mullonkal presented the California Court of Appeal with two issues: first,
whether the trial court has broad discretion to identify circumstances in which
reimbursement would be unjust, in addition to those enumerated in subsection
2641(c); second, whether Sithaj substantially benefitted from Carolyn’s education to
the extent that reimbursement should be reduced or denied proportionally.107 On
appeal, Sithaj contended that he was entitled to reimbursement as a matter of law
and that the trial court abused its discretion108 when it held that he substantially
benefitted from Carolyn’s education to the extent sufficient to deny reimbursement.109
Carolyn sought to affirm, arguing that subsection 2641(c) grants broad discretion to
the trial court to reduce or deny reimbursement when its award would be unjust.110 In
the alternative, Carolyn argued that the trial court properly found that Sithaj
substantially benefitted from her education under subsection 2641(c)(1).111
With respect to the first issue, Carolyn contended that because Sithaj had not
paid for any living or educational expenses while she repaid her student loans,
denying reimbursement was within the trial court’s broad discretion under subsection
2641(c).112 Sithaj countered that the trial court abused its discretion, insisting that
“the couple” is entitled to reimbursement for any funds used to pay Carolyn’s student
loans even if he made no direct or indirect contributions thereto.113
Mullonkal held that trial courts do not have broad discretion to find additional
circumstances in which reimbursement would be unjust under subsection 2641(c).114
103. Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
104. Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292.
105. See Sullivan, 691 P.2d at 1021–23; Slivka, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
106. See Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289; Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 785, 792; CLRC, Recommendation, supra

note 9, at 237 (noting the ten-year mark guiding now subsection 2641(c)(1) was to “limit the potential
for unreliable evidence of expen[ses]”).

107. In re Marriage of Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 292–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
108. “An abuse of discretion occurs when . . . the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding

of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion . . . .” Id. at 292 (quotations
omitted).

109. Id. at 289–90.
110. Id. at 292–93.
111. Id. at 296.
112. Id. at 292–93.
113. Id. at 291.
114. Id. at 293.
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Beginning with the rule of ejusdem generis,115 Mullonkal insisted that any
unenumerated circumstances relied on by the trial court must be “of the same kind” as
those enumerated;116 circumstances would be “of the same kind” if they ensured
“mutual benefit” and that no “windfall” resulted.117 Mullonkal held that criteria related
to a spouse’s work or economic sacrifices was irrelevant to ensuring that the pair
would mutually benefit or avoid windfall from a denial of reimbursement.118 As to
legislative intent, the court dismissed the Commission’s express distinction between
“working spouse” and “student spouse” as merely descriptive.119 Thus, Mullonkal
refused the possibility that the legislature intended for the “working spouse” to
actually work in support of the student spouse’s education, and sided with Sithaj who
argued that, as “the spouse of a physician[, he] was [not] expected to work.”120
With respect to the second issue, Carolyn asserted that she sufficiently rebutted
the presumption that the couple had not substantially benefitted from her education.121
She argued that she had paid Sithaj’s immigration fees, the couple’s living expenses
pre- and post-separation, including child care, travel expenses for the couple, and a
three-month trip to India for Sithaj alone.122 Sithaj countered that Carolyn “took
advantage of ” their allegedly “low standard of living” to pay her student loans.123
Sithaj also claimed that he only enjoyed a “few family vacations” rather than a
lifestyle commensurate with Carolyn’s salary.124
115. The doctrine of ejusdem generis presumes that the legislature, in listing items in a statute, intended for

any additional, unenumerated items to be of the same general nature or class as those expressly
enumerated. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 734 (Cal. 2000).

116. See Cal. Fam. Code § 2641(c)(1) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (reducing

reimbursement if working spouse substantially benefitted from student spouse’s education); § 2641(c)(2)
(reducing reimbursement if the community funded the education of both spouses); § 2641(c)(3)
(reducing reimbursement if student spouse’s education substantially reduces need for future support).

117. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 293–94. The Commission provided the following as an example of

“windfall”:

[T]o give the working spouse an interest in half the student spouse’s increased earnings
for the remainder of the student spouse’s life because of the relatively brief period of
education and training received during marriage is not only a windfall to the working
spouse but in effect a permanent mortgage on the student spouse’s future.

CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 234.
118. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 295–96.
119. Id. at 295.

120. Id. at 294; see Appellant’s Reply Brief at 27, Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (No. C085825) (“[T]here

is no evidence in the record, let alone substantial evidence, . . . that the parties had an expectation that
Sithaj—the spouse of a physician—was expected to work.”). The Mullonkal court found the “earn a
right” option to be inconsistent with the notion of California’s community property law system—any
one spouse’s income “belongs equally” to both. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 294.

121. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.
122. Id. at 288 n.2, 296.
123. Id. at 291, 296.
124. Id.
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Mullonkal held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Carolyn
rebutted the no-substantial-benefit presumption under subsection 2641(c)(1).125 The
Mullonkal court reasoned that evidence of the couple’s lifestyle—namely, their twobed, two-bath apartment in the suburbs of Roseville, California—showed that it was
“less than middle class.”126 The court reasoned further that they only lived in
Roseville for eighteen months despite marrying two years prior.127 Mullonkal also
held that the value of the couple’s “four trips” was insignificant against the value of
Carolyn’s student loans.128 Thus, the court concluded that Sithaj did not benefit from
Carolyn’s education to the extent necessary to rebut the no-substantial-benefit
presumption.129 Notably, the court cited no authority in support of this conclusion.130
The Mullonkal court erred when it held that Carolyn was required to reimburse
Sithaj.131 First, the court discounted section 2641’s legislative history132 and applicable
California precedent,133 both of which demonstrate that the trial court considered
proper criteria when it exercised its discretion to deny Sithaj’s reimbursement
request.134 The starting point in any reimbursement inquiry is to determine whether
the working spouse135 made economic sacrifices to support the student spouse’s
education but was denied an opportunity to benefit from that education once it was
125. Id. at 296.
126. Id. at 288, 296; Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 13. The appellate court’s description of the

Mullonkals’ lifestyle as “less than middle class” raises factual and legal concerns. First, the court
seemingly made a subjective judgment as to the couple’s way of life—at the time of its decision, the cost
of living in Roseville, California, was roughly 30 percent higher than the national average and the cost
of housing some 79 percent higher. Cost of Living in Roseville, California, Payscale, https://www.
payscale.com/cost-of-living-calculator/California-Roseville (last visited Apr. 19, 2022). The court’s
judgment is therefore concerning as a matter of law because it is well settled that a “showing on appeal
is wholly insufficient if it presents a state of facts, a consideration of which, for the purpose of judicial
action, merely affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion.” Brown v. Newby, 103 P.2d 1018, 1019
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (“An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”).

127. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288, 296.
128. Id. at 296. While the court valued Carolyn’s education at roughly $130,000, it did not estimate the value

of Sithaj’s immigration fees; the couple’s 2013 cruise, three trips to Hawaii, and Sithaj’s three-month
trip to India; or ordinary living expenses like the couple’s new car and child care for their son. Id. at
288–89.

129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 297.
132. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9 (contemplating reimbursement for a working spouse whose

support enabled the student spouse to earn a professional degree).

133. E.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Cal. 1984); In re Marriage of Slivka, 228 Cal.

Rptr. 76, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

134. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.
135. Indeed, there may even be a step zero—whether there exists a “working spouse” within the meaning of

Slivka. See 228 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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acquired.136 Even if the legislature did not contemplate limiting the “working spouse”
to one that actually works, courts have only held that reimbursement is appropriate
when that spouse made some economic sacrifice to support the other’s education,
usually by providing financial support or by forgoing their own education or career.137
And even when the working spouse has made a sacrifice of some kind, courts may
still credit evidence to reduce or deny reimbursement under subsection 2641(c) as is
just.138
Sullivan held that the wife was the working spouse and ordered the trial court to
determine whether her alleged economic sacrifices entitled her to reimbursement.139
There, the wife worked to financially support the couple so that her husband could
become a doctor; she also gave up her full-time career so that they could relocate for
his residency program and she obtained new part-time employment after the move.140
Slivka likewise ordered the trial court to determine whether the wife’s employment
to support herself and her husband during their five years of marriage while her
husband attended medical school entitled her to reimbursement.141
Sullivan and Slivka properly instructed their respective trial courts to evaluate the
economic sacrifices made by the working spouse to support the student spouse’s
education for purposes of determining whether reimbursement was just. In contrast,
Mullonkal did not ask whether Sithaj made economic sacrifices to support Carolyn’s
education.142 Instead, Mullonkal focused on whether Carolyn would receive windfall
if she did not reimburse Sithaj—without considering whether that gain, if any, was at

136. See Sullivan, 691 P.2d at 1022–23; Slivka, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 77, 81.
137. Compare Sullivan, 691 P.2d at 1021 (instructing the trial court to find whether reimbursement applied

when a wife financially supported the couple during her husband’s medical school program), and Slivka,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (finding that reimbursement was appropriate because the wife helped her husband
pay his medical school tuition), with In re Marriage of Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (awarding the difference between wife’s financial contributions to husband’s education and
the benefits she enjoyed after its acquisition as reimbursement), and In re Marriage of Watt, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 783, 791–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding reimbursement inappropriate when the working spouse
did not need to financially contribute to the student spouse’s education).
Family courts across the country have also enforced the reimbursement remedy as turning on
whether a spouse worked or made some sacrifice to put the other through school. E.g., In re Marriage of
Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680–81 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (reimbursing a wife after she “sacrifice[d] . . . her
own educational goals to support . . . her spouse”); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242 n.4 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (reimbursing a spouse who “sacrificed” for the other’s education); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453
A.2d 527, 536 (N.J. 1982) (reimbursing a wife who supported her husband’s education).

138. Cal. Fam. Code § 2641(c)(1) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (permitting courts

to reduce reimbursement as is just).

139. 691 P.2d at 1021–23.
140. Id. at 1022.
141. 228 Cal. Rptr. at 77, 81 (adding that the wife set aside her career for a dead-end job to support the

couple and raise their first child, and relocated to California for her husband’s career shortly thereafter).

142. See 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
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Sithaj’s expense.143 Mullonkal examined whether it is not inconsistent with legislative
intent to reimburse a working spouse who did not financially support the couple or
the student spouse.144 The court concluded that whether the working spouse
financially contributed to the other’s education, or even to the couple’s livelihood, is
irrelevant.145 The court reasoned that the legislative history146 used the term “working
spouse” merely to distinguish the student from the non-student spouse.147 If it were
that simple, though, surely the legislature would have referred clearly to the nonstudent spouse as exactly that—the “non-student spouse.” Mullonkal also concluded
that the working spouse did not need to “earn” reimbursement.148 Rather, it was
enough for Sithaj to argue that, because California community property law considers
Carolyn’s income to be his own,149 he technically contributed to her education and
therefore should be reimbursed.150
It is inconsistent with Sullivan and Slivka to regard the economic sacrifices
inquiry as irrelevant when applying section 2641, as Mullonkal did.151 When properly
applied, the remedy functions to make whole any working spouse who suffered an
actual loss.152 There is no case law or legislative history suggesting that it is appropriate

143. Id. But see CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 233 (noting that reimbursement kicks in when the

student spouse was put through school “at the [other’s] expense”). Notably, Mullonkal failed to consider
the reverse—whether Sithaj would receive a windfall if awarded reimbursement, in full or in part. 265
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 292–94.

144. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 295.
145. Id. at 295–96.
146. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9 (referring to spouses only as the “working spouse” and the

“student spouse” after finding that “[i]t is not uncommon for one spouse to work so the other can attend
school”).

147. See Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 295 (citing CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9). The court

reckoned that the legislature and the Commission termed the non-student spouse a “working” one only
“to describe the relevant party in a typical scenario the proposed legislation was designed to address:
where the education was received during the marriage and the nonstudent spouse was the sole worker.”
Id. That, coupled with the omission of the term “working spouse” from the provision recommending
reimbursement—which also omitted the term “student spouse” and referred to both only as “parties”—
sufficed to convince the court that the term itself was immaterial. Id. But see Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892) (interpreting a statute to cure only the evil for which it was
designed to address).

148. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 295.
149. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 760, 2550 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (splitting all real

and personal property acquired during marriage).

150. See Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 294–95.
151. Id. at 295.
152. CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 235 (“[Reimbursement] takes from the student spouse only

what was actually given and restores to the working spouse only what he or she actually lost.”). Anything
exceeding the actual loss incurred by the working spouse risks awarding windfall, which the Commission
expressly condemned. See text accompanying supra note 117.
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to reimburse a non-working spouse,153 and it is antithetical to section 2641’s purpose
to reimburse a spouse who did nothing to otherwise support the student spouse.154
Had the Mullonkal court properly followed the Sullivan and Slivka framework, it
would have concluded that the trial court employed proper criteria to deny Sithaj’s
reimbursement claim.155
Second, the Mullonkal court erred when it made a categorical rule out of the
“arbitrary,”156 rebuttable presumption that a marriage has not substantially benefitted
from a student spouse’s education if the marriage ended within ten years of its
acquisition.157 The court therefore failed to consider several benefits that Sithaj
enjoyed during his nearly four-year marriage.158 Weiner and Watt make clear that a
student spouse’s attempt to rebut the no-substantial-benefit presumption fails on the
whole only when the marriage “reaps no advantage from the education,” within the
ten-year time frame.159 If the marriage derived some benefit from the education,
then the presumption may be rebutted and the court may reduce or deny
reimbursement in a manner proportional to that benefit.160
Weiner instructed the trial court to find whether evidence that the wife shared in
her husband’s bonuses, which he would not have earned had he not been a doctor,
sufficed to rebut the no-substantial-benefit presumption.161 The court provided that
the presumption could be rebutted and reimbursement reduced or denied accordingly
even if those bonuses were of a lesser value than that of the husband’s education, and
despite their short-term marriage.162 Likewise, Watt held that it is unjust to award
153. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 235–36 (contemplating “other situations” where

reimbursement “is simply not appropriate”).

154. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. 783, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (denying reimbursement

absent sacrifice); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 691 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Cal. 1984) (looking to the economic
sacrifices made by the working spouse to determine whether reimbursement was warranted); O’Brien v.
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (reimbursing a working spouse who sacrificed “her own
[school] and career opportunities” to put her husband through school). But see Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 296 (finding that Sithaj did not work or make financial sacrifices for Carolyn’s education or their
family but awarding reimbursement anyway).

155. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.
156. CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 237.
157. Cal. Fam. Code § 2641(c)(1) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.); see CLRC,

Recommendation, supra note 9, at 236 (“[T]he reimbursement right should not be automatic in every
case, but should be subject to reduction or modification by the court if circumstances render
reimbursement unjust.”).

158. See Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.
159. Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 792; see also In re Marriage of Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292 (Cal. Ct. App.

2003).

160. Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 289–92 (finding that student loans totaled $12,217.14 but the wife’s share in bonuses was only

$9,600).
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full reimbursement where it cannot be said that the marriage “reap[ed] no advantage”
from the student spouse’s education.163
Carolyn’s “highly credible” evidence164 detailed the substantial benefits that she
and Sithaj enjoyed as a result of her education and exceeded that which sufficed for
rebuttal in Weiner and Watt.165 Mullonkal broke with precedent when it relied on the
duration of the couple’s marriage to hold that it would not be unjust to extort full
reimbursement from Carolyn.166 Unlike Weiner and Watt, Mullonkal gave dispositive
weight to the “low” value of benefits derived from Carolyn’s education and the
duration of the Mullonkals’ marriage.167 Specifically, the court rejected evidence that
the marriage benefitted from Carolyn’s education because the likely value of the
couple’s four-year, “less than middle class” lifestyle was “relatively small” compared
to that of Carolyn’s medical degree.168 But Mullonkal made no attempt to actually
value their life together, unlike Weiner, despite emphasizing the $130,000 value of
Carolyn’s education.169 The Mullonkal court also ignored one benefit many may
consider priceless: the opportunity to join the U.S. workforce, which Sithaj
relinquished when he allowed his work visa to expire.170 It is inconsistent with Weiner
to exploit the ten-year guideline as a means to refrain from finding that the benefits
to Sithaj sufficed to rebut the no-substantial-benefit presumption.171
Finally, Mullonkal ’s fixation on the length of the parties’ marriage distracted the
court from the most substantial benefit of all: Carolyn’s education and, in turn, her
enhanced earning capacity, operated to preserve Sithaj’s personal piggy bank.172
163. See Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 791–92.
164. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 17 (“[T]he [trial] court repeatedly found [Sithaj] and his evidence

not credible, while finding Carolyn and her evidence highly credible.”).

165. Compare Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (crediting evidence that the student spouse shared two bonuses

with the working spouse as sufficient to rebut the no-substantial-benefit presumption), and Watt, 262
Cal. Rptr. at 791 (denying reimbursement altogether when there was no evidence that the wife
contributed to the husband’s school expenses), with In re Marriage of Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285,
295–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (rejecting evidence that Carolyn paid for, among other things, Sithaj’s
immigration fees, three vacations to Hawaii, a cruise, his nearly three-month trip to India, entertainment
and dinners, a new car, child care, and the like, as insufficient to reduce reimbursement).

166. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296–97. In fact, Mullonkal rested its holding on no precedent at all. See id. at 296.
167. See CLRC, Recommendation, supra note 9, at 237.
168. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296.
169. See id. The court failed to consider several uncontested points of evidence detailing their comfortable

lifestyle—a cruise, dinners, entertainment, and a new car—all of which Carolyn paid for. See id.;
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 28, 35.

170. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 8, 21.
171. Compare In re Marriage of Weiner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (remanding to

determine whether a wife’s share in her husband’s bonuses, though less than the value of his student
loans, rebuts the presumption), with Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (refusing the possibility that
Sithaj’s all-expenses-paid lifestyle could rebut the no-substantial-benefit presumption and focusing
dispositively on the ten-year guideline).

172. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 292 n.5; see Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 36–37.
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Sithaj’s six-figure stock holdings and bank accounts remained effectively untouched
throughout his marriage plainly because Carolyn bankrolled his life.173 Mullonkal
should have credited, as Watt did, Sithaj’s ability to save resources as a direct benefit
of Carolyn’s education.174 Had Mullonkal acknowledged that the ten-year time frame
guiding the no-substantial-benefit presumption was not dispositive, it would not
have ignored the several substantial benefits that Sithaj siphoned from Carolyn and
it would have held that the trial court properly afforded Carolyn a determination as
to whether it would be unjust to award reimbursement in full or in part.175
Mullonkal ’s exchanging legislative history and California precedent for narrow
statutory rigors is a step back in time.176 In effect, Mullonkal nullified the trial court’s
broad discretion over family matters177 and created a new strategy to cash-in on
divorce—abuse an otherwise equitable remedy intended for working spouses who
suffered more than heartbreak.178 Mullonkal should have applied Sullivan and Slivka’s
economic sacrifices framework and Weiner and Watt’s two-part evidentiary inquiry
to protect against that abuse.

173. 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 288–89, 292 n.5; Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 36–37.
174. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 23, at 23 (“[Sithaj] used [his savings] for his sole benefit . . . .”).
175. Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296–97.
176. Compare id. at 297 (enforcing the literal mandate of subsection 2641(c)(1) to refuse the possibility that

reimbursement may be unjust even if the marriage lasted less than ten years), with De Burgh v. De
Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 606–07 (Cal. 1952) (circumventing the literal mandate of the fault divorce statute
to award a more equitable remedy).

177. In re Marriage of Boswell, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that family

courts have broad discretion).

178. See Mullonkal, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 295 & n.9.
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